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ABSTRACT
The article analyses shareholders returns of acquiring banks in the 
United Kingdom (U.K.) i.e., when U.K. banks acquire domestic banks 
and when U.K. banks acquire cross-border banks within the European 
Union (E.U.). The article includes 75% sample of the total population 
of bank to bank domestic acquisitions within the U.K. and cross-
border acquisitions within the E.U. from 2006 until 2013. The article 
comes to the conclusion, by the means of event study methodology, 
that the shareholders returns of acquiring banks are negative and 
statistically insignificant (–2.076%) when they acquire cross-border 
banks. The results of U.K. banks acquiring domestic banks indicates 
higher and statistically significant abnormal returns of 1.628% at 5% 
significance level as compared to cross-border returns gained by U.K. 
acquiring banks. The research found an overall insignificant abnormal 
return of –0.448% for shareholders of the acquiring banks for the 
entire portfolio. It can be concluded that, on average, shareholders 
of the acquiring banks experience negative abnormal returns and 
acquisitions do create (short-term) abnormal returns for the acquiring 
banks’ shareholders around the acquisition announcement time.
1. Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M. & A.) have become a universal phenomenon, with companies 
acquiring targets all over the world. World M. & A. activity in 2006 witnessed $3.8 trillion, a 
boost of 37.9% as compared to last year’s level, to a total of 36,958 deals (Bernad, Fuentelsaz, 
& Gómez, 2010). Agbloyor, Abor, Adjasi, and Yawson (2012) demonstrated that cross-border 
M. & A. activity drives banking sector development in Africa. Different variables determine 
cross-border M. & A., like deregulation, has a noteworthy effect on a bank merger. One of 
the explicit reasons of increased banking industry concentration across the E.U. during the 
last 15 years is the result of the government interventions and forced acquisitions driven 
by the 2007–2009 financial crisis (Santillán-Salgado, 2011). Barbopoulos, Paudyal, and 
Pescetto (2012) scrutinised that acquiring a firm in stricter capital control markets brings 
more value to shareholders’ wealth.
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Extensive researches have been carried out into whether acquisitions are wealth-creating 
or wealth-reducing events for acquiring shareholders, and different empirical studies have 
shown different results. The majority of early research on M. & A. is limited to the United 
States (U.S.) and U.K. economies than the E.U. markets. M. & A. deals in the E.U. region 
have significantly increased both in number and value as compared to the former decades 
(Mateev & Andonov, 2016). Cross-border bank M. & A. deals are increasingly prevalent 
in Europe since the mid- 1990s (Lozano-Vivas, Kumbhakar, Fethi, & Shaban, 2011). The 
fraction of domestic to cross-border bank M. & A. in the E.U. region has been almost five 
to one (Campa & Hernando, 2006).
The emphasis of this research is on U.K. and E.U. M. & A. deals and can be attributed to 
the competition carried by the single European market. The domestic orientation of E.U. 
companies resorted to takeover deals as a means to survive the tough domestic rivalries 
created by the new markets. The E.U., as compared to the U.S. and the U.K., is characterised 
as a weaker market in terms of investors’ protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1998). This research tries to arrest some evidences of the 2008 crisis and its effects 
on returns of bidder banks in the U.K. and the E.U.
The worth of the fifth merger wave in Europe was up to U.S.$ 5.6 trillion (Martynova 
& Renneboog, 2008), which was more than eight times the collective value of the fourth 
European merger wave (Mateev & Andonov, 2016).
Bhabra and Huang (2013) found no change in operating performance from pre- to 
post-acquisition period for the bidders. Highlighting the bank mergers, DeLong (2003) 
concluded that bank (horizontal) mergers do not produce any worth. However, Beladi, 
Chakrabarti, and Marjit (2013) suggested that vertical mergers can increase the gains from 
cross-border mergers. Typically, shareholders of target firms benefit from positive short-
term returns, whereas shareholders of the bidding firms usually face underperformance of 
the share prices in the month following the merger announcement (Fraser & Zhang, 2009). 
For bank-to-bank deals, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) found that excess gains exist in 
domestic deals and not for cross-border covenants.
Efficient market hypothesis proposed that share prices completely reproduce the assess-
ment of the available set of information (Aiginger and Tichy, 1991); therefore, it will be 
observed in the event window. This research empirically examines the effect of U.K. banks 
acquiring domestic banks and cross-border banks within the E.U. from 2006 to 2013. The 
research contributes to the already existing body of work that endeavours to explain how 
merger announcement translates into the value of shareholders’ wealth. The centre of atten-
tion is only on whether it improves or deteriorates acquirers’ shareholders wealth in the 
short term. The study tries to answer whether there has been a wealth creating or wealth 
reducing result for the shareholders of acquiring U.K. banks and if there exists a difference 
in the abnormal return created by U.K. banks in the acquisition of domestic or cross-border 
banks of the E.U.
The empirical tests of this study are based on event study methodology. The results show 
that the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of U.K. banks acquiring cross-border 
banks within the E.U. is –2.08% and is not statistically significant. The results of U.K. banks 
acquiring domestic banks indicate higher abnormal returns as compared to U.K. banks 
acquiring cross-border banks, and seem to be positive for most of the pre-bid and post-bid 
period. The average C.A.R. for the domestic acquisition is significantly positive. Moreover, 
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insignificant negative average abnormal returns –0.44% were seen over the entire event 
window (–7;+7) for the complete portfolio.
The article is organised as follows. Section 1 gives a brief introduction about the trend 
and determinants of M. & A., along with the research rationale. Section 2 discusses the 
trends of M. & A. in the banking sector and empirical evidence in the literature. Section 3 
explains the data and methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and Section 
5 concludes the study.
2. Literature review
U.S. covenants were ruling initially. In recent times, however, M. & A. activity in the 
European banking industry is booming. Cross-border acquisitions now accounts for 80% 
of all foreign direct investment by industrialised countries (United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development [U.N.C.T.A.D.], 2000). In this merger movement, U.K. acquiring 
firms have been playing a progressive and imperative role. Conn (2003) showed that the 
number and the value of cross-border acquisitions by U.K. firms has increased in the mid-
1980s and 1990s, and were more or less equal to the worth of domestic acquisitions over 
this period.
Numerous researches employed the event study methodology to investigate the impact 
of M. & A. on shareholders’ wealth (e.g., Frame & Lastrapes, 1998; Houston, James, & 
Ryngaert, 2001). The above empirical studies found that shareholders of the target firm 
enjoy considerable positive abnormal returns and shareholders of the acquiring firm take 
home negative abnormal returns from mergers. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) analysed 
the phenomena of M. & A. in 14 E.U. countries and found that European bank mergers pro-
duce returns for both the parties: i.e., target firms win; however, acquirer firms do not lose.
The results of Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) differ from those accounted for in U.S. 
bank mergers. The justification of different results could arise from the different regulation 
system of European banking markets, which are more alike among them as compared to 
the U.S. Conn (2003) and Jensen and Ruback (1983) found that there is a dominance of 
zero or negative cumulative abnormal returns for (both U.S. and U.K.) bidding firms, and 
the shareholders of target firms experience significantly positive returns. Nonetheless, the 
length of the event window determines the uniformity and consistency of the returns to the 
shareholders of acquiring firms. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) measured mean abnormal 
returns for different event windows for a healthier evaluation of the market reaction before 
and after the merger announcement. The empirical results clearly showed that the M. & 
A. of European banks depict a significant price effect, numerous days prior to the public 
declaration. This information is not new in the merger literature, as Bradley (1980) found 
that in general the market reacts to mergers at least ten days before the announcement. The 
most recent evidence by Bernad et al. (2010) showed that the valuation is poorly correlated 
before and after the acquisition. Whichever method is used, the performance effects of 
mergers and acquisitions can only be cherished in the long term.
3. Data and methodology
This article includes the U.K. as an acquirer and the European region as a target region for 
the period 2006 to 2013. Numbers of banks have been found through the screening process 
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in the database, Thomson One Banker, that holds data on M. & A. deals for the whole 
world. Since Thomson One Banker does not include financial data on the banks, that data 
was extracted from the Datastream database. Furthermore, either the M. & A. deals have 
been completed or not are included in the sample. The criteria to finalise the sample is to 
check data availability in the Datastream which narrows down 75% of the sample of the 
total population that was included in the study.
The rationale for extracting the announcement date and not the completion date is due 
to the fundamental proposition of efficient markets that believes the information (leaked) is 
reflected immediately in the stock prices after the merger announcement. Positive approach 
with the process of deduction and event study methodology has been used to estimate any 
abnormal return in the event window around the acquisition for the following research 
questions:
1.   Do acquisitions produce abnormal returns for the bidder (U.K.) banks around the 
period of the acquisition announcement?
2.   Does there exist a difference in the abnormal return produced by U.K. (bidder) 
banks acquiring domestic banks and U.K. (bidder) banks acquiring cross-border 
banks within the E.U.?
Strong (1992) proposed that the market model has probably been the most well-liked model 
and is used as a point of reference in event studies. The intention of the event study method-
ology is to evaluate observed returns of the stock around the announcement period with the 
performance of the market index. The increase of security prices after the announcement of 
a merger thus shows how positive the market evaluates the effects of the merger on the prof-
itability of the firm (Aiginer and Tichy, 1990). The reason for choosing the announcement 
date and not the actual merger date is because, according to the theory of efficient market 
hypothesis, the moment information is released is instantly reflected in the share prices.
The event window is the number of days for which the abnormal return that is caused 
by the event can be measured. If the event window is too short, there is a possibility of not 
catching the consequence of the event. The event window in this research is set to 15 days; 
seven days prior to and seven days after the announcement date. Daily stock returns will 
be calculated for the event window of 15 days.
t = 0 represents the announcement date, T1-T2 = Event Window and T0-T1 = Estimation 
Period of 90 days.
The estimation period is used to assess the values of alphas and betas of the stocks. Hence, 
the period should be sufficiently long to produce a representative measure of returns and 
also to reduce the biasness, but too long an estimation period can also bring biasness in 
the estimation with information from other events or changes in the general situations of 
the firms (MacKinlay, 1997). The estimation period of the study is kept to 90 trading days, 
whereas the weekends are excluded and the seven days of the event window are kept separate 
from the estimation period. This is done to make sure that the normal returns do not get 
affected by event-related returns. The computation of daily return for each bank and for 
the market index is calculated as follows:
Rit = (current day closing price – previous day closing price)/previous day closing price
Rmt = (current day market closing price – previous day market closing price)/previous 
day market closing price
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The abnormal return is the actual ex-post return of the share over the window period 
subtracted from the normal return of the firm over the same window period. The normal 
return can be defined as the expected return without conditioning on the event taking place 
(MacKinlay, 1997). The market model parameters are obtained in the estimation period and 
used in the event period to determine the expected return. The abnormal returns ARit can 
now be calculated in the event window by deducting the actual return Rit, with the expected 
return, as shown in the Equation (1):




 represents abnormal return in the event window at day t, Rit represents actual 
return and E (Rit) represents normal returns. The assumption of the market model is the 
linear relation between the market return and the share return. The model’s linear design 
follows the assumption of joint normality of asset returns. Practically, it is a well-built 
assumption and normally not likely to create any inconvenience, since the assumption is 
empirically sound and the implication of the normal return models likely to be robust to 
diverge from the assumption (MacKinlay, 1997). An ordinary least squares (O.L.S.) regres-
sion has been executed to estimate the model parameters estimates of αi, βi, the intercept 
and slope respectively, for each stock at every day in the estimation period.
For any given security i the market model is:
 
where Rit = Returns on security i on day t, Rmt = Return on the market portfolio in the 
period t,
ɛit = the zero mean disturbance term, αi and βi are the parameter of the market model and 
are estimated by running an ordinary least-square regression over the estimation window.
The Finacial Times Stock Exchange (F.T.S.E.) 100 index is used for the market portfolio 
because it will enable to make a fair comparison between the required returns and the 
returns from the top 100 companies. The market model signifies more perfection over the 
constant mean return model. By eliminating the section of the return that is associated 
with the variation in the market’s return, the variance of the abnormal return is decreased. 
This consecutively can lead to increaseing the capability of model to uncover the impact of 
the event. This study uses the market model because it incorporates all three models i.e., 
mean adjusted model, market adjusted model and also constant mean return model. The 
advantage of using the market model will rely upon the value of R2 of the market model 
regression. The higher the R2, the greater is the variance reduction of the abnormal return, 
and the larger is the gain (MacKinlay, 1997).
The notion of cumulative abnormal return (C.A.R.) over the event window is employed in 
the study for the purpose of an overall conclusion of abnormal return in the event window. 
C.A.R. (t1, t2) is the cumulative abnormal return (C.A.R.) from t1 to t2. The C.A.R. from t1 
to t2 is the sum of the included abnormal returns:
 
For any period in the event window,
(1)ARit = Rit − E(Rit)
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The average cumulative abnormal returns can then be calculated over the sub-periods and 
over the entire event window of 15 days using the same method as that used to calculate 
the C.A.R.s.
4. Results and analysis
The event windows are divided into sub-periods, as Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) meas-
ured mean abnormal returns over numerous event windows for a healthier appraisal of 
market reaction before and after the deal’s announcement and to analyse the results from 
different angles to observe if there is any significant abnormal return in any of these dura-
tions. C.A.R.s given in Table 1 to the shareholders of acquiring banks over the entire event 
window period are not statistically significant at 5%. Each of the t values corresponds to a 
separate test therefore, for all of the dates.
Looking at the results of the pre-bid period (–7; –1), the acquiring bank portfolio has 
realised excess gains of 13.2%, showing acquiring shareholders gaining wealth acquiring 
either domestic or cross-border banks, as shown in Table 1. The large amount of positive 
abnormal return can suggest that the information might have leaked a week before the 
announcement. Pilloff (1996) unveiled a mean value-weighted C.A.R. of 1.44% (significant 
at 10%) for the 11-day window (–10, 0); however, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) observed 
2.86%, significant at 1%; yet the two results are not significantly different.
Pre-bid event windows of (–1;+1) and (–1; 0) show that shareholders are getting negative 
returns of 11% and 11% respectively in this study. Zhang (1995) revealed that the weighted 
average C.A.R. for five days (–2;+2) is about 7%, whereas Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) 
found a mean around 3%. These two results are significantly different at the 1% level. 
However, the closest set of the period in this study (–1;+1) realised –11.7% C.A.R. which 
in not statistically significant.
Moving towards the results of the post-bid period (0;+1) and (+1;+7), the shareholders 
of the acquiring banks get negative returns of 16%, 4% and 6% respectively. Houston and 
Ryngaert (1994) showed the average value of weighted C.A.R. of 0.4% for a five-day window 
(–4; 0). The nearest event window by Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) showed the average 
















Table 1. Portfolio c.a.R.s of event sub-periods.
notes: table 1 reports c.a.R.s for bidder banks over for different sets of event windows. abnormal returns are estimated using 






). For any given security i the market model Rit = αi + βiRmt + ɛit, where αi and βi are esti-













*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 90, 95 and 99% level of significance, respectively.
source: authors’ calculations.
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The abnormal return of the whole period in this study (–7;+7) is also negative (–6.7%), 
depicting a sign of wealth deterioration of the acquiring bank shareholders in the entire 
portfolio. All the t values are not significant for the entire sub-periods at the 5% significance 
level. This means that the returns earned pre- and post-announcement are not statistically 
significant from the returns around the announcement.
The C.A.R. results for the cross-border, domestic and the entire portfolio for each day is 
shown in the Table 2 and show that average abnormal return of the entire portfolio to the 
acquiring shareholders for (t–7), (t–1), (t0), (t+1), (t+2) and (t+7) come out to be significant 
at 5% for (t-7) and 1% for all others. The overall trend in this window is that the returns are 
insignificant in the pre-bid period. However, most of the C.A.R.s are statistically significant 
in the post-bid period. This situation concludes that acquisitions do create (short-term) 
abnormal returns for acquiring firm shareholders around the period of the acquisition 
announcement.
Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013) and Houston et al. (2001) also found that 
acquiring shareholders earn negative but non-significant abnormal returns from merger 
deals. Jenson and Ruback (1983) concluded that the returns for shareholders of the acquir-
ing firms were close to zero. Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) revealed that average 
abnormal return to acquiring shareholders were equal to –0.7% which is very close to the 
findings of this study, i.e., –0.44%, but both of these results are not statistically significant 
to conclude whether acquiring shareholders were losers or winners in the acquisition game. 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) revealed that the average abnormal return to the 
shareholders acquiring firms were 1.1% over the period. Andrade et al. (2001) found that 
the average abnormal returns for approximately 4,000 completed financial and non-financial 
mergers was –3.8% for acquirer which also supports the result of this study the large amount 
of loss in Andrade et al. (2001) could be due to large number of firms.
Table 2. cross-border, domestic, portfolio c.a.R.s and cumulative average abnormal returns (c.a.a.R.).
notes: table 2 reports cumulative abnormal returns for bidder banks over 15-day event windows (t–7; t+7). U.k. banks in 
domestic acquisitions during 2006–2013 are compared to U.k. banks in cross-border acquisitions during the same period. 






). For any given security i the market model 
is Rit = αi + βiRmt + ɛit, where αi and βi are estimated by running an ordinary least-square regression over the estimation 














. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 90%, 95% 








C.A.R.s (%) T test
t-7 −8.083 −1.107 1.419 0.484 −6.664 1.988**
t-6 8.676 2.154** 3.465 0.610 12.141 1.345
t-5 −16.549 −1.245 −4.232 −1.416 −20.781 −0.974
t-4 −6.609 −1.054 −0.228 −0.066 −6.837 −0.619
t-3 −0.033 −0.025 6.231 6.587*** 6.198 0.571
t-2 6.777 0.784 17.888 2.532*** 24.665 1.282
t-1 1.982 0.549 2.507 0.434 4.489 4.932***
t = 0 −1.477 −0.971 −14.321 −1.028 −15.799 5.000***
t+1 −7.658 −2.404** 7.226 1.139 −0.432 4.898***
t+2 0.370 0.106 −2.112 −0.320 −1.743 2.570***
t+3 −2.436 −0.657 4.197 1.210 1.761 0.153
t+4 −5.896 −1.305 5.159 1.441 −0.737 −0.038
t+5 1.288 0.310 0.458 0.207 1.746 1.215
t+6 3.954 1.672* −2.745 −0.318 1.210 0.104
t+7 −5.454 −0.913 −0.490 −0.078 −5.944 2.597***
caaR −2.076 −0.273 1.628 1.987** −0.448 −0.944
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The C.A.R.s of the entire portfolio, especially on (t–7), (t–1), (t0), (t+1), (t+2) and (t+7), 
gave significant results. It can be concluded that on average, shareholders of the acquiring 
firms experience negative returns. Conn (2003) concluded that there is the majority of nil 
or negative cumulative abnormal returns for acquiring firms for both the U.S. and the U.K. 
These results are analogous to (Andrade et al., 2001; Sudarsanam & Mahate, 2003) for the 
U.S. and the U.K. respectively.
The results of the test conducted on U.K. acquiring domestic banks reveals higher abnor-
mal returns as compared to U.K. banks acquiring cross-border banks of the E.U. as shown 
in Table 2. In addition to that, when U.K. banks acquire U.K. banks, the acquirer returns 
seem to be positive for most of the pre-bid and post-bid period. The average C.A.R. for the 
domestic acquisition is significantly positive, 1.628%, at 5%. Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-
Requejo (2011) also found that cumulative average abnormal returns (C.A.A.R.) for the 
shareholders of acquiring firms for the whole sample is 0.99%, in the period (−1;+1), and 
was found statistically significant. Daily domestic C.A.R.s for (t–3) and (t–2) are positive 
and significant at the 1% significance level as compared to C.A.R.s for cross- border acqui-
sition for the same days. However, for the event windows of (t–6) and (t+6), cross-border 
returns are higher as well as significant at 5% and 10% respectively, as compared to domestic 
returns for the same days. This shows that that the domestic abnormal returns are signif-
icantly higher than and dissimilar to the cross-border abnormal returns. Few studies did 
not support the above results and found significant negative abnormal returns of –0.99% 
over both the pre-announcement and post-acquisition period (Conn, 2003; Sudarsanam 
& Mahate, 2003).
Furthermore, investigation of the portfolio of U.K. banks acquiring cross-border banks 
in the E.U. shows the insignificant average C.A.R. of –2.08%. Thus, it cannot be concluded 
that the shareholders of acquiring banks create wealth in regard to the acquiring announce-
ment. The explanation of numerous insignificant results could be due to too small abnor-
mal returns for test detection, as Bartholdy, Olson, and Peare (2007) suggested that the 
abnormal returns need to be above 2% for each day in the event window. Amihud, DeLong, 
and Saunders (2002) showed that banks involved in international acquisitions realise neg-
ative abnormal returns as found in this study, but they are not as negative as in domestic 
acquisitions.
Figure 1 shows that on average domestic acquisitions have higher returns than cross-bor-
der acquisitions. A significant change in returns can be seen after the date of the announce-
ment. It could be due to mispricing, speculation or expectations. Positive returns in 
cross-border acquisitions can be seen for (t–6), (t–2), (t–1), (t+2), (t+5) and (t+6), and 
these results are analogous to Doukas and Travlos (1988), who investigated the effect of 
cross-border acquisitions on the security prices of U.S. acquiring firms and found that 
shareholders of the bidders enjoy significant positive abnormal returns when firms grow 
into new business and geographic areas. Conn (2003) also showed insignificant positive 
returns in cross-border acquisitions. The average C.A.R. of the domestic acquisition comes 
out to be significantly positive in depicting the shareholder wealth gains, but for cross-border 
acquisitions it is insignificantly negative, showing wealth deterioration. The common thing 
in both the graphs is that there is a steep gradient around the announcement days, which 
suggests that information might have leaked before the announcement or it might be an 
instant market reaction or scepticism. On the whole, the returns for cross-border acquisi-
tions are inferior to domestic acquisitions. Thus, the internalisation theory of cross-border 
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mergers is held up (Conn, 2003). Cybo-Ottone and Murgia’s (2000) results seem to signify 
that positive gains in shareholder wealth are connected to the average domestic bank–
to-bank M. & A. and to banking deals.
5. Limitations and future research
We investigated the short-term bidder returns. The event window can also be increased 
to see the long-term bidder returns. There is room to include more sample of other near 
countries such as the European Free Trade Association (E.F.T.A.) and other European coun-
tries, or even Asian markets, as the Asian financial crisis also led to many acquisitions. The 
research concludes that domestic bidders outperform when acquiring domestic banks. This 
could be attributed to the additional risks that business transactions carry while cross-bor-
der transaction and is not present in domestic transactions. These risks arise as a result of 
differences in economic structures, policies, socio-political environment and currencies. 
Further studies can explain the possible risks that led to negative returns in cross-border 
acquisition. Studies can also see the impact of country specific determinants on the M. & 
A. value in different stages of economics cycle.
6. Conclusion
The focus of this article is on the subject of shareholders’ returns of the acquiring banks; 
more specifically, whether the acquisition by U.K. banks have been wealth-creating or 
wealth-reducing events for the shareholders. The returns were analysed for the period 
2006–2013. The study also highlights the difference in the abnormal returns between domes-
tic bank-to-bank acquisitions and cross-border bank-to-bank acquisitions. Using the event 
study methodology and data extracted from Thomson One Banker and DataStream data-
bases, research questions were tested using t statistics to detect the significant differences 
in abnormal returns across the two portfolios, i.e., domestic and cross-border.
The empirical evidence shows insignificant negative average abnormal returns over the 
entire event window by –0.44% for the entire portfolio. Andrade et al. (2001) and Jensen and 
Ruback (1983) support the results that the acquirer’s shareholders experience insignificant 
negative returns or the returns are close to zero respectively. Moeller et al. (2005) argued that 
the average abnormal return to the shareholders of acquiring firms is 1.1% and is near to the 
statistically significant findings of this study for the average domestic C.A.R. of portfolio. 
Now, moving to the results of the portfolio of U.K. banks acquiring cross-border banks, 
Figure 1. c.a.R.s for domestic and cross-border acquisitions. source: created by authors.
note: the above figure shows acquirers’ c.a.R.s over the period from seven days prior and seven days after the bid 
announcement; Day 0. the overall bidders’ returns, i.e., for their domestic and cross-border acquisitions, have been reported.
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nothing can be concluded about the returns of the shareholders of acquiring banks, since 
results did not come out to be statistically significant and is analogous to the earlier empir-
ical results of Conn (2003). This could be explained by the motive theories; for instance, 
one would anticipate a negative return if the market interprets too high a bidding price, 
possibly as a result of managers’ over‐optimism or agency basis.
The use of asingle currency, the euro, has laid added stress on E.U. firms, as it abolished 
all currency risks within Europe, which decreases the home bias of investors (Mateev & 
Andonov, 2016). Public policy (after crisis) should now focus on the rise of huge and 
extremely interrelated banks that has transmuted the financial system and are considered 
‘too important to fail’. The probability of system-wide contamination has increased in the 
case of distress (Davies, Richardson, Katinaite, & Manning, 2010).
The recent hot debate on ‘Brexit’ is on whether the U.K. should exit European Union or 
not. If it does, how will it effect the whole scheme of U.K. banks acquiring domestic banks 
and cross-border banks within E.U.? There is a very high probability that the U.K. will 
exit from the E.U. following the referendum on 23 June 2016 (Harmer, 2016). However, 
despite this fear, the U.K. has outpaced Europe for early-stage M. & A. activity, and this 
activity is likely to increase in the next six months (Neuwirth, 2016). The stakes are high, as 
Goldman Sachs and Citigroup recently cautioned that if the U.K. leaves E.U., growth and the 
pound value of the pound would further decrease (The Brexit delusion, 2016). Moreover, 
Passporting of British banks into the E.U. would not be likely after a Brexit except there is 
an exceptional arrangement (Douglas-Henry, Kamerling, & Macpherson, 2015).
In the case of Brexit, E.U. merger regulator rules would remain intact where the juris-
dictional tests apply. Yet, there will be two main differences. First, the one–stop-shop rule 
will not apply, i.e., businesses could be encountered to take separate merger clearances from 
the U.K. and the E.U. competition authorities. This would increase supervisory ambiguity 
and also transactional costs. Second, the U.K. would lose its power to ‘call in’ a merger for 
U.K. concern where the effects of an E.U. merger were likely to be qualified in the U.K. 
(Shepherd & Wedderburn, 2015).
It can be concluded that, on average, shareholders of the acquiring banks experience 
negative returns and acquisitions do create (short-term) abnormal returns for acquiring 
firm shareholders around the period of the acquisition announcement. Moreover, share-
holders gain positive abnormal returns in the case of domestic acquisition; but vice versa 
in cross-border acquisition. According to Bernad et al. (2010), whichever method is used, 
the performance effects of merger and acquisitions can only be valued in the long run. The 
results from the test conducted on the portfolio of U.K. acquiring domestic banks show 
higher abnormal returns as compared to U.K. acquiring cross-border banks.
Disclosure statement
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